The Haqqani Network: Terrorists or Insurgents

The definition of terrorism is broad and open to interpretation. Hoffman, in his obligate Inside act of terrorism, suggests that terrorism is the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear by violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of semipolitical change. Schwartz, Dunkel, et al, define terrorism in their Studies in departure & international deoxyadenosine monophosphateere deoxyadenosine monophosphate terrorism article entitled Terrorism An Identity Theory Perspective, as the deliberate targeting of civilian sites for attacks designed to result in destruction of those sites and/or the injury and death of noncombatant civilians. Together, these two perspectives coupled with someoneity scheme and will serve as the basis for an evaluation of the Haqqani mesh and their interrelationships and interactions with know terrorist root words such as the Taliban and al-Qaida as well as with Pakistans soldiers and government news show agencies.The Haqqani Network Who A re They and Why do We consider? The Haqqani meshwork is an Afghan and Pakistani radical of fighters that operates primarily in southeast Afghanistan as a semi-autonomous component of the Taliban with fold up ties to Pakistans Army and information agencies (Rassler et al. July 14, 2011, p. -2). The Haqqani meshs leadership body structure is hierarchical in temper with members of the patriarchs family filling top leadership mappings (Rassler et al. July 14, 2011, p. 7). This familial structure is an important cultural identicalness marker that can serve to further terrorist activities. Furthermore, Schwartz, Dunkel, et al address the family as it relates to upholding honor and avenging wrongs done to the family. This is interesting because even those who sympathize and support terrorism, but dont actually come in in it, ofttimes sh atomic number 18 the same level of social identity based upon their group affiliations.This tends to show how the Haqqani network is able to exert its trance over their colleague groups without actually having to be in control of them. It appears to be a symbiotic relationship w here the Haqqani network clearly benefits from bi-directional credibleness of link with the Taliban and al-Qaida. Rassler et al support this claim when they discuss the relationship between ranking(prenominal) Haqqani network leaders and their close operational relationships with the Taliban and al-Qaida, revealing that thither is often no distinction.This share identity-based connection legitimizes the Haqqani network with the segment of the Afghan conjunction that believes in radical Islam and jihad. This was evidenced when the Haqqani network helped sustain al-Qaidas relevancy and branding as the leader of the global jihadist movement. All in all, it appears the Haqqani network just wants their proverbial place at the table so to speak. Clearly, it must be working, as current assessments put the strength of the group close to 15,000 f ighters. The Haqqani Network Duplicity at WorkAmerican intelligence and military officials claim the Haqqani network is a proxy draw off used by the Pakistani intelligence service Pakistans Inter-Service Intelligence ISI agency to carry out grisly, high-profile attacks. The question here is whether this is a relationship of convenience or an alliance due to shared identity. The secret relationship with ISI coupled with links to al-Qaida and the Taliban clearly shows the need to solicit support (e. g. , material, financial, spiritual, etc. ) and ultimately rally the masses behind them.Furthermore, for decades, the Haqqani network has been a mentor to Arab, Uzbek, Chechen, Turkish, and Pakistani jihadists. These associations speak to the core of shared identity and the interactions among the groups, as check to Schwartz, Dunkel, et al social and cultural identity is form when members come together based upon common beliefs shared across the group, and individual identity represen ts personally chosen goals, values, and beliefs coupled with their perspectives of the universely concern around them.The engage of terrorism necessitates (according to Schwartz, Dunkel, et al) that we non only understand the effects of identity, but in like manner the interactions among these levels. In addition, we need to look at the importance of the wider community as Schwartz, Dunkel, et al put it, Without local, and sometimes international support, those engaged in terrorist attacks would set out it substantially more difficult, if not impossible, to conduct their activities. Working with the Taliban, al-Qaida, and Pakistans ISI is a duplicitous role that provides credibility within, and across, multiple dimensions of jihad (Rassler et al.July 14, 2011, p. 5) establishing the shared identity necessary to imbue respect and connectivity as part of an influential group dynamic. Why is all this important? The Haqqani networks credibility in the region, especially with the tribal groups of Afghanistan, helps extend the Talibans reach and because the Haqqani network is utile militarily, they act as a force multiplier for the Taliban. This puts the Haqqani network in a regional leadership position, and Schwartz, Dunkel, et al suggest that this leadership role would be considered admirable providing further social capital.The Haqqani Network Terrorist Threat or Insurgency? So with such a significant fighting force that is radicalized, is the Haqqani network a terrorist organization pitted against Western ideology, or is it only when an insurgency focused on eradicating outsiders who have forced their way into the Afghani homeland? According to the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the Department of State as of kinfolk 15, 2011, the Haqqani network is not listed as a foreign terrorist organization. Despite this, according to the Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, The U.S. military has long been frustrated by pestilent operations c arried out against its troops in Afghanistan by Haqqani Network forces. They excerpt U. S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta as saying, We cannot have the Haqqanis coming across the bump into attacking our forces and Afghans and disappearing back into a safe haven in Pakistan. In between the rhetoric, the real reason they arent on the terrorist list is because there is a belief that, such a move would scuttle both chances that the group might make peace with Afghanistans government. To make our decision, it is demand that we not lose sight of the need to fairly evaluate this group from the point of view of that group and not from the Westernized framework we can slowly apply to it. Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg, point out that, Scholars insistence that terrorists are somehow not like us but, instead, abnormalinsane, power hungry, or a faction of bothis a classic exercise in out-group stereotypingwhich undermines the analytical return of the interpretations in use. Applying th is to the Haqqani network and to prevent us from being constrained by our (Western) cultural boundaries, it is incumbent upon us to look at the Haqqani network from their advantage point. The clearest and most-recent message came in September of 2011 when Sirajuddin Haqqani (the son of the groups patriarch, Jalaluddin Haqqani) told The wire in the United Kingdom via a telephone interview, There are sincere people in the Afghan government who are loyal to the Taliban as they know our goal is the liberation of our homeland from the clutches of occupying forces. With this, their actions, and their relationships, it is presumable that the Haqqani network is interested more in the local issues and having local diverge than it is in trying to wage a global jihad against the West. A such, their lack of inclusion from the list of terrorist organizations is still valid. Bibliography Brannan, David W. , Esler, Philip F. , and Strindberg, N. T. Anders. 2001. Talking to Terrorists Towards a n Independent analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism. Studies In Conflict & angstrom unitamp Terrorism 24, no. 1 3-24. Goodspeed, Peter. National Post, About the Haqqani network. Last limited September 30, 2011. Accessed November 24, 2011. http//news. nationalpost. com/2011/09/30/about-the-haqqani-network Griffin, Emory. A First Look at conversation Theory. radical York The McGraw-Hill Companies, 1997. Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York Columbia University Press, 2006. Mazzetti, Mark, Scott Shane, and Alissa Rubin. New York Times, Brutal Haqqani offense Clan Bedevils U. S. in Afghanistan. Last modified September 24, 2011. Accessed November 23, 2011. http//www. nytimes. com/2011/09/25/world/asia/brutal-haqqani-clan-bedevils-united-states-in-afghanistan. html? pagewanted=all.Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, The Haqqani Nexus and the development of al-Qaida. Last modified July 14, 2011. Accessed Novembe r 11, 2011. www. ctc. usma. edu. Shahzad, Faizul. Taliban deflect American Perceptions of the Haqqani-ISI Relationship. Terrorism Monitor. 9. no. 37 (2011) 1-2. http//www. jamestown. org/uploads/media/TM_009_Issue37. pdf (accessed November 10, 2011). Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , &amp Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict &amp Terrorism, 32(6), 540. Websites Referenced http//www. cfr. org http//www. tc. usma. edu http//www. dawn. com http//www. foreignaffairs. com http//www. jamestown. org http//news. nationalpost. com http//www. nytimes. com/ http//www. state. gov http//www. telegraph. co. uk http//www. thedailybeast. com http//tribune. com. pk http//www. understandingwar. org/themenode/haqqani-network &8212&8212&8212&8212&8212&8212&8212&8212&8212&8212&8212&8212&8212&8212 1 . Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism (2nd ed. ). New York, NY Columbia University Press. p. 40. 2 . Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman , A. S. (2009). Terrorism An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 537-559. 3 . ibidem(p. 540)Identity theory for our purposes will cover up cultural identity, social identity, and personal identity. 4 . Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qaida. Last modified July 14, 2011. Accessed November 12, 2011, www. ctc. usma. edu. 5 . The Haqqani networks patriarch and leader is Jalaluddin Haqqani, although it is reported that he may be in ill health, and his son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, is running the day-to-day operations. http//www. cfr. org/afghanistan/institute-study-war-haqqani-network/p26126 6 .Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 542. 7 . Ibid. 8 . Ibid (p. 548) 9 . Much like the traditional phrase, guilt by association, I suggest there could be credibil ity by association. It is design that is often discussed in marketing whereby a person, product, or play along gains credibility by associating itself with a larger more recognized person, product, or company (e. g. , a computer with the Intel Inside sticker on it). 10 . Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown.The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qaida. Last modified July 14, 2011. Accessed November 12, 2011, www. ctc. usma. edu. (p. 40) 11 . Ibid (p. 43). 12 . http//tribune. com. pk/story/259314/sirajuddin-haqqani-dares-us-to-attack-n-waziristan/ 13 . Mazzetti, Mark, Scott Shane, and Alissa Rubin. New York Times, Brutal Haqqani aversion Clan Bedevils U. S. in Afghanistan. Last modified September 24, 2011. Accessed November 23, 2011. http//www. nytimes. com/2011/09/25/world/asia/brutal-haqqani-clan-bedevils-united-states-in-afghanistan. html? pagewanted=all. 14 .Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism (2nd ed. ). New York, NY Columbia University Press. p. 199. 15 . Goodspeed, Peter. National Post, About the Haqqani network. Last modified September 30, 2011. Accessed November 24, 2011. http//news. nationalpost. com/2011/09/30/about-the-haqqani-network 16 . Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 540. 17 . Ibid. 18 . Ibid (p. 548) 19 . Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qaida. Last modified July 14, 2011. Accessed November 12, 2011, www. ctc. usma. edu. (p. 13) 20 . Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 550. 21 . The current list of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations contains 49 entries, but the Haqqani Network is not one of them. http//www. state. gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085. htm 22 . Faizul Shahzad , Taliban Reject American Perceptions of the Haqqani-ISI Relationship, Terrorism Monitor, 9, no. 37 (2011) 1-2, http//www. jamestown. org/uploads/media/TM_009_Issue37. pdf (accessed November